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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
BOARD OF NATURAL RESOURCES v. 
BROWN: NEW YORK GROWS ROOTS IN 
WASHINGTON 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Board of Natural Resources v. Brown,l the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that provisions in the Forest Re-
sources Conservation and Shortage Relief Act2 violated the 
Tenth Amendment by compelling western states to issue regu-
lations according to Congress' instructions.3 In so doing, the 
court recognized the ongoing vitality of the Tenth Amendment 
as· a limitation on the power of Congress to use states as in-
struments of federal regulation.4 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The State of Washington owns several tracts of timber 
land which it holds in trust for the benefit of various public 
institutions and various counties.6 Prior to the passage of the 
Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Act (hereinafter 
1. Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993) (per 
Wallace, C.J., joined by Wright, J., and Leavy, J.). 
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 620·620j (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (amended in 1993, see infra 
note 17). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
4. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). The Supreme 
Court, in an opinion written by O'Connor, J., held that the Tenth Amendment for-
bids the federal government from compelling the states to issue regulations accord-
ing to its instructions. [d. at 2421. 
5. Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 941 (9th Cir. 1993). 
235 
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"the Act"} in 1990, the majority of unprocessed timber harvest-
ed from these lands was exported for sale overseas, where it 
attracted a higher price than in the domestic market.6 
On October 24, 1990, the United States Secretary of Com-
merce (hereinafter "the Secretary") delivered an order pursu-
ant to the Act, directing the State of Washington to issue regu-
lations banning from export seventy-five percent of all unpro-
cessed timber harvested from its state-owned lands.7 The fol-
lowing year, the Secretary issued an order instructing Wash-
ington to maintain its timber export ban at the seventy-five 
percent level.s One year later, in 1992, the Secretary issued an 
order directing Washington to increase the level of its export 
ban to one-hundred percent of all unprocessed timber harvest-
ed from its state-owned lands.9 
As a result of the timber export restrictions imposed by 
the Secretary, the expected income from Washington's lands 
was projected to decrease by an estimated $500 million over 
the following ten years.10 In response to this projected reduc-
tion in expected future income, seven of the counties (hereinaf-
ter, collectively, "the Counties") that were beneficiaries of the 
Washington land, as well as other plaintiffs, brought suits 
against the Secretary of Commerce and the federal govern-
ment. ll These cases were consolidated in the United States 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 941. 
11. Id. at 942. The Counties sought declaratory judgment against the Secretary 
of Commerce on both Tenth Amendment and Fifth Amendment due process 
grounds. Id. The due process claim was based on the fact that private timber 
lands in the state were not regulated in a fashion similar to the state-owned 
lands. Id. at 943. This claim, which had been rejected by the District Court, was 
also rejected by the Ninth Circuit employing the rational basis test. Id. The Ninth 
Circuit held that under the rational basis test, a federal statute passes constitu-
tional muster as long as it is "somewhat related 'to the achievement of any combi-
nation of legitimate purposes.'" Id. (quoting Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schs., 
487 U.S. 450, 463 (1988». The court found that the different treatment of public 
and private lands at issue was rationally related to Congress's belief that the loss-
es in state revenue induced by the export bans would be offset by state savings in 
social service expenditures resulting from increased domestic timber mill employ-
ment as a result of the Act. Moreover, the court found that because this reciprocal 
relationship does not obtain with regard to private timber growers, the disparate 
2
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District Court for the District of Washington. 12 
The Counties sought a declaratory judgment that the Act 
violated the Tenth Amendment's prohibition against impermis-
sible federal infringement of state sovereignty.13 The Counties 
alleged that the Act abridged the State of Washington's Tenth 
Amendment rights by compelling the state to enact regulations 
pursuant to the federal government's instructions.14 
The Counties and the federal government both moved for 
summary judgment on this issue.16 The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the federal government and the 
Counties appealed. 16 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE FOREST RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND SHORTAGE 
RELIEF ACT 
In 1990, Congress enacted the Forest Resources Conserva-
tion and Shortage Relief Act (hereinafter "the Act").17 The Act 
treatment of the two groups was constitutionally justified. [d. at 943. 
Edward McLarney joined the Counties' suit in the District Court as a coun-
ty resident, taxpayer and county commissioner. [d. at 942. McLarney's role as a 
party in the suit played no significant part in the Ninth Circuit's decision. [d. at 
946. 
The Washington State Boards of Education and Natural Resources, as trust-
ees of public lands adversely affected by the Act, also brought suit for declaratory 
judgment against the Secretary of Commerce. [d. at 942. Their suit repeated the 
due process claim asserted by the Counties and also alleged that by passing the 
Act the federal government had breached a duty that it owed Washington as the 
original grantor of the trust lands to the state. [d. at 942-44. Both claims were 
rejected by the lower court as well as by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 942-44. 
12. [d. at 942. 
13. [d. at 942, 946-47. 
14. [d. at 946-47. 
15. [d. at 942. 
16. Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 942. This note will limit itself in 
scope to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' treatment of the Counties' Tenth 
Amendment claim. 
17. 16 U.S.C. §§ 620-620j (Supp. III 1990). Throughout this note all references 
to the Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 620-
620j, pertain to the original version of the Act as enacted in 1990. The Act was 
amended in 1993 primarily to cure the constitutional defects discussed. See infra, 
notes 50-78 and accompanying text. 16 U.S.C. §§ 620c, 620d (Supp. V 1993). The 
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was designed to conserve timber within the United States and 
increase the supply of unprocessed timber to domestic timber 
mills.18 The Act sought to accomplish these goals by restrict-
ing the export of unprocessed timber from federal and state-
owned lands located in the western continental United 
States. 19 
As enacted, the Act consisted of two essentially indepen-
dent parts.20 The first part restricted the export of unpro-
cessed timber harvested from federal lands within the conti-
nental United States west of the lOOth meridian.21 The sec-
ond part of the Act restricted the export of unprocessed timber 
from state-owned lands within this geographical area.22 
The Act divided states into two categories for purposes of 
the export restrictions.23 In states where the total annual 
sales volume of unprocessed timber harvested from state-
owned lands constituted less than four hundred million board 
feet, the Act placed a complete ban on the export of state-
owned unprocessed timber.24 In states where the annual sales 
volume exceeded that amount,25 the Act called for an initial 
seventy-five percent export ban on state-owned unprocessed 
timber together with a scheduled increase in the percentage 
banned over time.26 In this latter category, the Act also pro-
vided the Secretary of Commerce with the discretionary power 
to increase the level of the export bans if certain conditions 
were met.27 
amended Act currently requires the ~ecretary of Commerce to directly prescribe 
timber export bans rather than directing the states to enact the bans under their 
own state law. 16 U.S.C. § 620c (Supp. V. 1993). 
18. Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 941 (9th Cir. 1993). 
19. [d. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. The 100th meridian refers to that line of longitude one·hundred de-
grees west of the prime meridian. As a rough indication of the geographical area 
within the Act's reach, the 100th meridian runs just east of Bismarck, North Da-
kota. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1994 486 (Robert Famighetti ed., 
Funk & Wagnills Corp. 1993). 
22. Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 941. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. At the time of the Ninth Circuit's decision on May 4, 1993, only Wash-
ington fell into this category. [d. 
26. Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 941. 
27. [d. The Secretary of Commerce may increase the percentage of unprocessed 
4
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As part of the regulatory scheme addressed to the states, 
the Act required the states to issue or enact regulations imple-
menting the timber export bans.28 
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT INTERPRETATION OF THE 
TENTH AMENDMENT IN NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES 
In reaching its decision concerning the Counties' Tenth 
timber to be banned from export based on a determination that the purposes of 
the Act are not being adequately served by the current level of export prohibi-
tions. Factors to consider in making this determination are: 
(1) actions or decisions taken, for the purpose of conserv-
ing or protecting exhaustible natural resources ill the 
United States, which have affected the use or availability 
of forest products; 
(2) whether the volume of timber from public lands that 
is under contract has increased or decreased by an 
amount greater than 20 percent within the previous 12 
months; and 
(3) the probable effects of unprocessed timber exports on 
the ability of timber mills to acquire unprocessed timber. 
16 U.S.C. § 620(c) (Supp. III 1990). 
28. Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 941. Two of the Act's provisions, 
16 U.S.C. § 620c(d)(2) and § 620c(d)(3)(A), explicitly required states to issue regu-
lations in accordance with the Act. Section 620c(d)(2) stated in relevant part: 
Each State shall determine the species, grade, and geo-
graphic origin of unprocessed timber to be prohibited from 
export . . . and shall administer such prohibitions consis-
tent with the intent of sections 620 to 620j of this title. 
[d. at 947 (ellipses in opinion by the Ninth Circuit). (The purpose behind the 
requirement that states determine the characteristics of the timber to be banned 
from export was to ensure that such timber represented a fair cross-section of the 
species, grades and geographic origin of all unprocessed timber harvested for sale 
from the state-owned lands. 16 U.S.C. § 620c(d)(2) (Supp. III 1990». Section 
620c(d)(3)(A) stated in relevant part: 
[T)he Governor of each State to which [the Act) ap-
plies . . . shall . . . issue regulations to carry out the 
purposes of this section, the promulgation of which shall 
be consistent with section 553 of Title 5. Such regulations 
in each State shall remain in effect until such time as 
the legislature of that State enacts such requirements as 
it deems appropriate to carry out this section. Before 
issuing such regulations, the Governor shall enter into 
formal consultation . . . with appropriate state officials. 
Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 947 (ellipses in opinion by the Ninth 
Circuit). 
The federal government argued that these two provisions actually worked to 
the benefit of the states by "insuring the participation of state officials who are 
attuned to the needs and concerns of their constituents." [d. at 945. 
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Amendment challenge to the Forest Resources Conservation 
and Shortage Relief Act,29 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in New 
York v. United States.30 
In New York, the Supreme Court was faced with a Tenth 
Amendment challenge by the State of New York31 to the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (here-
inafter "the Waste Policy Act").32 One provision in that Act, 
labeled "the take-title provision," required the State of New 
York to choose between adopting the Waste Policy Act's regula-
tory scheme for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste and 
taking legal title to and assuming liability for the low-level 
radioactive waste generated within the state.33 Upon review, 
the Supreme Court declared that the take-title provision vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment.34 
After reviewing the history of the original Constitutional 
Conventions, the Court declared that the Founders had envi-
sioned the Tenth Amendment as the embodiment of the gener-
al principle that the new federal government was to "exercise 
its legislative authority over individuals" rather than "attempt 
to coerce [the] states ... in their political capacity.,,35 From 
29. See infra notes 50-78 and accompanying text for a full description of the 
Counties' Tenth Amendment challenge. 
30. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). 
31. 1d. 
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021 (Supp. III 1985) amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2021d 
(1988). 
33. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2427. 
34. 1d. at 2429. As an initial matter the Supreme Court was forced to consider 
existing Tenth Amendment precedent which held that the principal constitutional 
protection of state sovereignty against federal overreaching resided in each state's 
political representation in Congress. 1d. at 2420. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Reviewing its past cases in this area, 
the Court declared that this rule had been applied only in situations where Con-
gress enacted legislation generally applicable to both the states and private per-
sons alike. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420. The Court distinguished the instant case 
on the ground that it involved federal legislation directed exclusively at the state 
governments themselves. 1d. 
35. 1d. at 2422. Beyond the history of the Amendment, the Court bolstered its 
rationale for this new rule by pointing out the destructive effect a contrary rule 
would have on political accountability at both the state and federal levels. 1d. at 
2424. The Court reasoned that were Congress allowed to conscript the states as 
agents of federal regulation, on the one hand, Congress would be shielded from ac-
6
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this principle the Court deduced the "new" constitutional rule 
that the Tenth Amendment serves to prohibit Congress from 
compelling the states to enact regulations according to its in-
structions.36 
While the "new" Tenth Amendment rule prohibited Con-
gress from coercing the states into adopting regulatory 
schemes, the Court made clear that not all Congressional ef-
forts directed at inducing the states to regulate amounted to 
illegitimate coercion.37 The Court noted that Congress may 
legitimately encourage the states to regulate by conditioning 
the use of an enumerated federal power upon the enactment of 
such regulation.3s The Court stated the two primary means by 
which Congress may legitimately encourage the states to act: 
(1) Congress may condition federal regulatory preemption of an 
activity upon state adoption of a regulatory scheme under the 
federal Commerce Power; and (2) Congress may condition the 
delivery of federal funds upon adoption of a regulatory scheme 
under its Spending Power.39 
Finally, the Court held that just as Congress may not 
coerce the states into regulating by direct fiat, Congress is also 
prohibited by the Tenth Amendment from forcing the states to 
choose between a requirement to regulate and consequences 
that lie beyond Congress' power to impose.4o 
countability by the veneer of state action, while, on the other hand, the states 
would be able to avoid political responsibility by pointing to the federal legislative 
mandate. ld. Either way, the important principle of direct political accountability 
would be vitiated with harmful results for both state and nation. New York, 112 
S. Ct. at 2424. The Court asserted that by denying Congress the power to coerce 
states into adopting regulations the new rule would work to obviate the potential 
for this type of accountability vacuum. ld. 
36. ld. at 2423, 2428. See National League of Cities, et al. v. Usery, 426 U.S. 
833 (1976) (holding that Congress could not use its Commerce Power "to force 
directly upon the States its choices to how essential decisions regarding the con-
duct of integral government functions are to be made") (overruled by Garcia v. San 
Antonio Transit Authority et aI., 469 U.S. 528 (1984». 
37. ld. at 2423·24. 
38. For example, under its Spending Power, Congress may condition the re-
ceipt of federal highway funds by the states upon their adoption of fifty-five mile-
per-hour highway speed limits as state law. See id. 
39. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2423, 2424. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 cl. 3 (Com· 
merce Power). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 cl. 1 (Spending Power). 
40. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2427-29. 
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It was this last aspect of its "new" Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence that the Court brought to bear on the case at 
hand in New York.41 The Court found that the Waste Policy 
Act's take-title provision in essence constituted a forced choice 
for the State of New York between adopting the federal waste 
disposal scheme and taking title to and assuming any atten-
dant liability for the low-level radioactive waste within its 
borders.42 The Court declared that the first option, the fiat 
requirement that New York adopt the federal waste disposal 
scheme, clearly violated the "new" Tenth Amendment rule and 
that, in addition, the second option, the take-title provision 
also lay beyond the power of Congress.43 In the Court's view, 
the alternative that New York take title to the waste was 
tantamount to a Congressional command to the government of 
New York to subsidize its radioactive waste producers.44 As 
such, the take-title provision represented an attempt by Con-
gress to "commandeer" the New York State government and 
therefore violated the Tenth Amendment.46 The Court held 
that since each alternative offered to the State of New York by 
the take-title provision - the requirement to regulate and the 
requirement to take title - violated the Court's newly an-
nounced Tenth Amendment principles, the provision in its 
entirety also violated the Tenth Amendment.46 
The "new" Tenth Amendment rule established by the Su-
preme Court in New York marked a departure from the princi-
ple that state sovereignty is protected through the states' rep-
resentation in Congress.47 As such, at least in the context of 
federal legislation directed exclusively at the states, New York 
provided a new constitutional beachhead from which litigants 
could challenge Congressional Acts.4s It was from this beach-
head that the attack on the Forest Resources Conservation and 
Shortage Relief Act of 1990, giving rise to Board of Natural 
41. Id. at 2427·28. 
42.Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 2428. 
45. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428. 
46. Id. 
47. See Garcia, 469 U.S. 528 (holding that in the vast majority of cases the 
fact that members of the national legislature represent the states is sufficient to 
protect the states' interests). 
48. See Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d 937. 
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Resources v. Brown, was launched.49 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit resolved a preliminary standing issue in 
the Counties' favor50 and turned to consideration of the merits 
of the Counties' Tenth Amendment challenge.51 
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF NEW YORK V. 
UNITED STATES TO THE FOREST RESOURCES CONSERVATION 
AND SHORTAGE RELIEF ACT 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by stating that the 
Counties' challenge fell within the Tenth Amendment princi-
ples recently pronounced by the Supreme Court in New York v. 
United States.52 The Ninth Circuit reiterated the broader hold-
ing of New York, that the Tenth Amendment protects the sov-
ereignty interests of the states against undue federal encroach-
ment by placing limits on "Congress's power to use the states 
as implements of regulation."53 The court also restated the 
derivative rule developed in New York that while Congress 
possesses broad powers to directly regulate activities in many 
areas, "including ... areas of intimate concern to the States," 
it nevertheless lacks the power to directly compel the states "to 
govern according to [its] instructions."54 
49. See id. 
50. Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 946 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(per Wallace, C.J., joined by Wright, J., and Leavy, J.). The court noted that the 
fact that the State of Washington had not only declined to challenge the Act on 
behalf of the Counties but had supported it in other litigation did not bar the 
Counties from bringing this Tenth Amendment challenge. [d. Following New York 
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), the court held that Washington's consent 
to the Counties' litigation was unnecessary because: 1) The support or consent of 
the state is irrelevant to the question of whether the Tenth Amendment had been 
violated; 2) Tenth Amendment federalism principles do not serve to protect the 
states as abstract entities but rather to protect individuals through the diffusion of 
sovereign power; and 3) consideration of the Counties' claim in this case would 
serve judicial economy should Washington plan to challenge the Act in the future 
and the principles of federalism if Washington should not. [d. at 945·46. 
51. [d. at 946. 
52. [d. 
53. [d. See supra notes 29·49 and accompanying text for a discussion of New 
York v. United States. 
54. Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 946·47 (quoting New York v. U.S., 
9
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The Ninth Circuit focused its attention on two provisions 
contained in the Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage 
Relief Act (hereinafter "the Act").55 The first provision direct-
ed each state affected by the Act to determine certain charac-
teristics of the timber to be banned from export and to admin-
ister export prohibitions consistent with the intent of the 
Act.56 The second provision, which applied only to those states 
in which the annual sales volume of timber exceeded 400 mil-
lion board feet,57 directed the governors of these states to for-
mally consult with appropriate state officials and then to issue 
regulations carrying out the purpose of the Act.58 The latter 
provision further required that the regulations so issued 
should remain in effect until such time as the legislatures of 
the states enacted similar prohibitions. 59 
Upon review of the two provisions, and without elabora'-
tion, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the provisions constitut-
ed facial violations of the Tenth Amendment's protections of 
state sovereignty rights as set out in New York.60 In the 
court's view, the provisions constituted "direct commands to 
the states to regulate according to Congress's instructions"61 
and therefore violated the "new" Tenth Amendment rule that 
the "Federal Government may not compel the States to enact 
or administer a federal regulatory program. "62 
Having concluded that the two provisions violated the 
112 S. Ct. at 2421). 
55. 1d. at 947. 
56. 1d. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 620c(d)(2)). See supra note 28 for the text of 16 
U.S.C. § 620c(d)(3). 
57. 1d. At the time of the case only Washington fell into this category. See suo 
pra note 25 and accompanying text. 
58. 1d. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 620c(d)(3)(A)). See supra note 28 for the text of 16 
U.S.C. § 620c(d)(3)(A). 
59. Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 947. 
60. 1d. at 947. 
61. 1d. 
62. 1d. (quoting New York v. U.S, 112 S. Ct. at 2435). The Ninth Circuit con· 
sidered whether these two provisions were severable from the rest of the provi· 
sions in the Act directed at the states (16 U.S.C. § 620c (Supp. II 1990) amended 
by 16 U.S.C. § 620c (Supp. V 1993)). The court determined that while the provi-
sions in question were not severable from the rest of 16 U.S.C. § 620c and thus 
16 U.S.C. § 620c must be struck down in its entirety, 16 U.S.C. § 620c was suffi· 
ciently independent from the rest of the Act to allow for the remaining provisions 
(directed at federal lands) to stand. 1d. at 947·49. 
10
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Tenth Amendment, the court, nevertheless, turned to an evalu-
ation of the two major arguments asserted by the federal gov-
ernment in support of the view that the Act did not violate the 
Tenth Amendment.63 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S TREATMENT OF THE GoVERNMENT'S 
DEFENSES 
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the federal government's 
contention that the Act did not in fact compel Washington to 
enact the regulatory scheme at issue.54 The government rea-
soned that the Act did not compel the State of Washington to 
enact regulations banning timber exports because the state 
"could avoid the Act altogether by simply halting all sales of 
timber."65 
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument on two grounds. 
First, the Act was compulsory in nature because the language 
of the Act itself was unconditional.66 Second, even if the Act 
were construed as containing the implied choice proposed by 
the government, this choice, as with the choice offered by the 
statute in New York, was one that the federal government had 
no power to impose upon the state.67 The court stated that the 
requirement that Washington halt its timber sales should it 
choose not to adopt the federal regulations essentially present-
ed the state with a "Hobson's choice."68 Washington could not 
simply halt all timber sales from its trust lands, for by doing 
so, the state would breach its "fiduciary duty to manage the 
trusts in the best interests of the beneficiaries."69 The Ninth 
Circuit declared that Congress had "no authority" to impose 
63. Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 947. 
64. Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993) (per 
Wallace, C.J., joined by Wright, J., and Leavy, J.). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. (citing New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428). The choice expressly offered the 
State of New York by the federal statute in New York was between enacting the 
federal low-level radiation waste disposal scheme or taking title to and assuming 
liability for the low-level radioactive waste within the state. New York, 112 S. Ct. 
at 2428. See supra notes 29-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of New 
York v. United States. 
68. Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 947. 
69. Id. 
11
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this requirement upon the state as alternative to adopting the 
federal regulations.70 
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the government's argu-
ment that "because the provisions in question could not be 
enforced in court, they constitute[d] precatory admonitions 
rather than commands to the states."71 The court rejected this 
argument as well, holding that the Act's provisions were com-
mands to the states for two reasons. First, the provisions were 
enforceable by the federal courts under the long line of Su-
preme Court cases upholding "the power of federal courts to 
order State officials to comply with federal law.,,72 Second, the 
provisions were mandatory upon the states as well as enforce-
able by the federal courts under the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution.73 The Supremacy Clause "makes federal law 
paramount over the contrary positions of state officials," and 
also grants the federal courts the "authority to order [the 
states] to comply."74 Thus, under both case precedent and con-
stitutional mandate, the provisions in the Act did not consti-
tute mere precatory admonitions directed toward the discretion 
of the states.75 Instead, the provisions in the Act constituted 
direct commands to the states by the federal government with 
which the states were legally bound to comply.76 
In sum, the Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments offered 
by the federal government in defense of the Act. The court 
rejected the government's "implied choice" argument because 
70. 1d. 
71. 1d. 
72. 1d. (quoting New York v. U.S., 112 S. Ct. at 2430). 
73. Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 947. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
The text of the clause reads: 
1d. 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding. 
74. Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 947 (quoting New York v. U.S., 
112 S. Ct. at 2430). 
75. 1d. 
76. 1d. 
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the language of the Act simply would not support it and, more-
over, because the choice itself was illegitimate under the Tenth 
Amendment.77 Similarly, the court rejected the "mere precato-
ry admonitions" argument because the Supremacy Clause of 
the Constitution binds the states by federal law and, in con-
junction with federal case precedent, provides for the enforce-
ment of federal law against the states in the federal courtS.78 
v. CONCLUSION 
In Board of Natural Resources v. Brown,79 the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals continued the line of new Tenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence begun by the Supreme Court in New York 
v. United States.80 The Ninth Circuit applied the newly fash-
ioned principle that Congress is denied the constitutional pow-
er to conscript the state governments as agents of federal regu-
lation and struck down federal statutory provisions requiring 
the State of Washington to enact regulations according to con-
gressional instructions.81 The Ninth Circuit left unresolved, as 
had the New York Court, the exact boundaries of illegitimately 
conscriptive practices in this regard. However, there is little 
doubt that given the appropriate case, the Supreme Court will 
draw at least some of these lines and thereby provide guidance 
in the future for both the Ninth Circuit and all other students 
of the Tenth Amendment. Until that time, the legal community 
should be content that, by its decision in Board of Natural 
Resources, the Ninth Circuit has put its mark on this new and 
interesting area of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence engen-
dered by the Supreme Court in New Yor~ v. United States. 
Robert E. Arnold III" 
77. [d. 
78. [d. 
79. Board of Natural Re80urces v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993). 
80. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). 
81. Board of Natural Resources, 992 F.2d at 946-47. 
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